The public sector is traditionally presented as reluctant to change. Using an adaptive systems framework and following a grounded theorizing approach, I analyze four cases of successful organizational transformation though the management of crises as a momentum for change. Crises help only if they are managed as such a momentum. My conclusion is that organizational dynamics is roughly the same in the private and in the public sector and that appropriate crisis management may lead to a performing organization. I stress the key success factors for a successful management of crisis as a momentum for change: learning is the key point and public managers appear to have a fair ability to learn, but learning needs to be formalized before updating mental maps in public management.
Introduction
When their environment changes, organizations need to update their mission and goals, conceive new strategies and transform their organizations especially in a context of technological breakthrough. This is a tough task within the market sector, which had to learn a lot during the last 15 years, confronted with a huge pressure from a new competitive environment and new production processes due to the new technological trend, but with the support of large academic sectors from sociology organizations, systems science and management. This is a tougher task in the public sector, which is said to be a laggard in updating its strategic framework and benefits from a poorer support by part of academic research in management.
The role of crises has been under survey for many years (Midler, 1995) , but never precisely assessed in the global scenario of organizational transformation. The seminal researches by Patrick Lagadec (1991) on technological crises introduced crisis in the manager's frame of reference and pointed out their lack of preparation, crisis management having no room in their mental maps. More recently, Freeman and Louça (2000) and especially Carlota Perez (2003) , through a new lecture of Kondratiev cycles, outlined that technological revolution is driven by disruptive innovation which introduces a paradigm shift in the management of the technological, economical and socio-political sub-system of a society. Crisis is a compulsory step of these paradigm shifts and crisis management will become a major art to steer the transition towards the information society. Managing change in the public sector is critical for two reasons: first, in the new growth theory framework, public institutions play a major role in building the competitive advantage of nations. Second, if public institutions are not able to change themselves, they won't be able to manage the global change process for society. In this sense, change in institutions relies heavily on the ability to monitor change within public organizations.
Reviewing cases of successful organizational changes in the public sector, my conclusion is twofold: first, successful change is possible following rules basically similar to those applied in the private sector. Second, in each of these cases, the process began with a crisis, whether provoked or the fruit of hazard. Crisis appears to be the starting point, whether managers undergo the crisis or they profit from it to start the change process: that is what I will call the crisis as a momentum for change. The momentum may be considered as an endogenization of the crisis to foster the evolutionary process through which change happens. Managing momentum appears to be a critical stage in the transformation of organizations towards organizational excellence. This paper deals essentially with the role of crises in a global change in the dominant paradigm that governs the decision-making in public services' organizations. It proceeds to analyze four successful episodes where crisis has been such a momentum, allowing the organization to change. a) In point 1, I explain why crisis is part of the picture in the context of the new technological cycle and what is at stake with public services. My basic assumption is that if public institutions are not able to integrate the new paradigm at the organizational level -i.e. in their internal management -they won't be able to innovate in the institutional framework and to monitor the transition at the macro-level. b) In point 2, I assess the problem of monitoring change within public services, why it may be more difficult than in businesses that interact directly with a market. Focusing on the case of the French public sector, which is said to be reluctant to change, will give us the opportunity to discuss the different public services patterns and roles, as national and path dependant systems, and what is at stake in modernizing them. c) In point 3, I review four case studies reflecting two main different patterns, the US (market driven) and the French (public driven) and point scenarios, leaders strategies and key success factors.
d)
In point 4, I evaluate my findings and draw conclusions for crisis management in public sector organizations and how this would help trigger change in public institutions.
1-Crisis as a momentum: why, what and how?
My assumption regarding the challenges faced by public services is twofold: first, crisis is part of the picture whether the cause is endogenous or exogenous. Crises are the result of a dual mismatch: at the macro level between institutions and the techno-economic environment due to the disequilibrium provoked by technological change, and at the micro-level between public institutions and organizations and the problems they face.
At the macro-level, growth is the result of the global performance of a society, thus the systemic effects of interactions between its economical, social, political and technological components. I agree with Erik Reinert, one of the leaders of Evolutionary, or Schumpeterian economics as an alternative to neoclassical economy, "the existence of such systemic effects is the fundamental reason why the State exists" (Reinert, 1999, p.286) . The existing state is a consequence of an historical or evolutionary process of equilibrium and disequilibrium between the five subsystems of a society: science, technology, economy, politics and culture as shown in figure 1 (Freeman, 2000) .
Figure 1 about here
Crisis is the consequence of the disequilibrium provoked by new technologies disruptive inputs in the technological subsystem. This disruption propagates first to the economic subsystem that has to integrate the new technological paradigm. The pioneering work by Carlota Perez (2003) describes the dynamics of such paradigm shift that propagates, since the first industrial revolution, through cycles made of "bubbles and golden ages": Each cycle begins with a core technological input provoking disruptive innovations in leading industries and the rise of new industries. These new industries call for investments based on promises of new profit sources.
Being largely irrational, these promises lead to the birth and the burst of a financial bubble leading to a crisis. Overcoming the crisis gives way to a long phase of expansion, the golden age, steered by the integration of the new technologies in the production process producing growth and the global increase in the standard of living.
Crisis is the fruit, as Schumpeter described it, of "that kind of change arising from within the system which so displaces its equilibrium point that the new one cannot be reached from the old one by infinitesimal steps" (Schumpeter, 1911) . Being farther from this disruption, public administrations and their structures tend to integrate the new paradigm more slowly. While the public subsystem was leading change in the golden age period of the cycle, it is now a laggard and this lag becomes a cause for the persistence of the disequilibrium of the global system.
Getting out of the crisis is a dual wager for public administrations. On the one hand, the public sphere, as a subsystem, has a specific role to play, mainly as rule maker. North defines public institutions as "a set of rules, compliance procedures and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the interest of maximizing the wealth" (North, 1981, p. 201) . So, the public sphere is not only in charge of building institutions that reduce transaction costs, but has a direct influence on the evolution of the other subsystems, cultural and scientific. Besides, for David Landes, the distinction between culture and institutions is very blurred, reflecting each other (Landes, 2000) . On the other hand, the public sector has a key role to play in favoring the congruence of the five subsystems toward the building of a stable complex system that would mean the end of the crisis through the full assimilation of the new paradigm and the entering in a new golden age. This is consistent with the recently developed metasystem transition theory that is the evolutionary process by which higher levels of complexity and control are generated (Heylighen, Joslin, Turchin, 1997) . The new system will emerge from the interactions between the subsystems through a trial and error learning process.
System theory provides us with another understanding of the alternation of periods of stability then obsolescence of the incumbent system, turbulence and transition towards a more complex system through the successful management of the crisis period. The recent research by Michaël Biziou (2003) clearly demonstrates that the real meaning of the "invisible hand" is the intuition that society may converge toward a superior order of harmony. Biziou underlines that this system of thinking was present in Adam Smith's thought: the role of the political power is to organize the congruence of subsystems toward a global harmony, and it is the greatness of the sovereign to improve, by its intentional action, the natural sub-optimal order of the society 1 .
To sum it up: the longer public institutions take to integrate the new paradigm, the longer and more costly the adjustment and the more probable society will lose ground in maintaining its competitive advantage.
-Crisis as a means for public services, considered as adaptive systems, to integrate the new paradigm
This paper focuses on change in public organizations. Organizations and institutions co-evolve as North put it "Both what organizations come into existence and how they evolve are fundamentally influenced by the institutional framework. In turn, they influence how the institutional framework evolves" (North, 1990, p. 5) . Thus organizations and their entrepreneurs 1 Smith is particularly clear on this point in his "Theory of moral sentiments ": "All constitutions of government, however, are valued only in proportion as they tend to promote the happiness of those who live under them. This is their sole use and end. From a certain spirit of system, however, from a certain love of art and contrivance, we sometimes seem to value the means more than the end, and to be eager to promote the happiness of our fellowcreatures, rather from a view to perfect and improve a certain beautiful and orderly system, than from any immediate sense or feeling of what they either suffer or enjoy." (part IV) are agents of institutional change: analyzing how they get out of a crisis and build a new equilibrium may tell us a lot about how institutions may evolve.
Change is especially difficult in public services, as it is in organizations, for two main reasons: firstly, the management is split between technical and political personal. The technical management has no authority or responsibility for strategic change and the political management has limited technical management knowledge. Moreover, due to a rapid turnover in both technical and management personal, building organizational capability tends to be given a low priority and is at best typically under capitalized. The second reason is the lack of feedback from the market that would alert the organization to mismatch between the services it provides and public expectations. " [L] istening to clients" remains the major drive for change (Midler, 1995) .
and "listening to citizens" is a much more complex task. These reasons are valid for all developed countries confronting the paradigm shift: the weaker the outcome of a public organization, the weaker the interaction from its stakeholders and the impetus for change. Organizations may come under "Parkinson's law:" maintaining their bureaucracy becomes their aims and their structure is justified by their mere existence. This is unlikely to change until the critical point where the "value for money" ratio becomes unacceptable, either for budgetary collapse or for ostensible social inefficiency. In my case studies, the French Forest Office and The City of Charlotte belong to the first case, NYPD and French Library to the second.
A crisis may create a momentum both for the coalescence of technical and managerial competencies within civil servants and politics and for the social demand being heard by managers and employees, making the move towards organizational reform affordable.
The cause of the crisis may be exogenous or endogenous. Even though endogenous are more foreseeable than exogenous ones, crises are always an exogenous event that challenges the internal equilibrium of the organization. This event may be either a financial deadlock or a disjunction with social expectations. At the nation-state level, contemporaneous crises originate in public finances deadlocks (New Zealand, Australia, Canada, UK, France…). But the very source of theses crises relies on the decreasing returns of institutions and in the increasing costs of their underlying organizations.
Analyzing rhythms of equilibrium may be carried out using the concept of resilience that is "The ability of human communities to withstand external shocks or perturbations to their infrastructure, such as environmental variability or social, economic, or political upheaval, and to recover from such perturbations." (Adger, 2000) . Another way of defining resilience is the amount of disruption needed to transform a system from one stable state to another system that will be more complex and stable with a better ability to deal with the issues of its environment. A social system may be described as adaptive (Holling and Gunderson, 2002) , going through a four phases cycle: a period of rapid growth and exploitation, leading into a long phase of accumulation (K) with a resulting growing focus on the conservation of the organization and a closing to external influence during which resilience tend to decline, then a rapid breakdown or release phase (Ω), finally closing with a short phase (α) of renewal and reorganization. In this phase, the system is resilient and is able to reorganize and to introduce novelty, new institutions, ideas and strategies (figure 2).
In the r to K phase, the production phase, the system capitalizes resources, institutionalizes and improves its internal connectedness. By the time, the system loses contact with the exterior and runs for itself. Moving towards K, it tends to lose its resilience.
In the Ω to α phase, the innovation phase, the system becomes rapidly turbulent and novelty can enter but loses resources and needs to build new resilient configuration (α) to initiate a new r to K phase that will lead to a more stable system. Ω is classically the crisis episode with a loss of potential (budget cut and downsizing) and of connectedness (social crisis) as shown in figure 2.
Through cycles of adaptive stages, the system accumulates knowledge, memory and improves its organizational capability and its ability to build solutions that are more resilient. If the system is not able to rebuild resilience in the r phase, it will degenerate. Based upon four episodes of successful organizational change with crisis happening at various stages, I will try to assess successful strategies. -Change is systemic and embedded in historico-cultural tradition I chose to study these adaptive cycles in two different contexts: that of the US, which typically illustrates a market driven national innovation system (NIS), and that of France, which represents on the contrary the archetype of the public based NIS. I analyze NIS in a broader sense than the classical interaction between science, technology and economy. The inclusion of institutional diversity allows comprehending the differences between national competitive advantages (Amable, 2002) making the dynamics of public institutions part of it.
Today, the French public system appears to be a laggard in reforming itself and reluctant to change. According to the mainstream explanations of neoclassical theory, it would suffice to consider public services mainly as "service providers" -i.e. to reduce their roles to those of a supermarket (Christensen & Laegreid, 2002 Practically, public services reforms based on these principles didn't deliver the results they promised. NPM intent, such as advocated by OECD (1995 OECD ( , 1996 , was to promote a global paradigm change concerning the control and organization of public services, making it converge toward the same universal model. It is today questioned on several points: first, the model didn't promote a convincingly convergence between nations, as the compared cases of two NPM countries -New Zealand (NZ) and Norway -demonstrated it (Christensen & Laegreid, 2002) .
Second, the efficiency of NPM has been questioned in the emblematic case of NZ: focusing mainly on outputs, it succeeded in "doing the things right" but failed in "doing the right things."
There is no room in a neo classical framework for outcomes for the state does not deal with information asymmetries and just tends to be a "supermarket" delivering service to its clients. In such a perfect information model, outcomes evaluation is not necessary. As Allen Schick put it "The neglect of evaluation in the New Zealand model was not accidental; it derived from the notion that government can purchase all the information it needs in the marketplace of ideas » (2001). Today, NZ is reengineering its public monitoring system focusing on outcomes. Third, NPM failed in reaching its initial goals. In her study on allocation patterns among three NPM majors in the US (Indianapolis, Los Angeles, New-York), Lynne Weikart concludes that all three majors real strategies has been unintended: Small, rather than large decreases in taxes, spending of savings in public works rather than tax reductions, and an increase in the debt and reallocation of resources towards strategic goals such as public safety (Weikart, 2003) .The main reason is that the neoclassical theory ignores the systemic effects of the action of the state on economic growth.
I agree with Reinert in his exploration of the role of the State since the Renaissance: its existence is a condition to reap the benefits of synergies between human activities (Reinert, 1999) . This means that markets and capital are only building blocks (on which mainstream economic theory focuses) that have to be emulated by other components, techniques and knowledge. Growth and Welfare are the product of systemic effects between these building blocks, positive feed-backs and increasing returns: "the existence of such systemic effects is the fundamental reason why the state has a role to play in economic growth" (Reinert, 1999) . In the neoclassical pattern, there are no increasing returns, so institutions don't matter. On the contrary "with increasing returns, institutions matter and shape the long paths of economies" (North, 1990, p. 95) This is the reason why, for a thorough understanding of public services adaptive cycles, I need to integrate their "long path" or historical trajectory and their resulting path dependency. These different patterns have historical roots that may be understood by analyzing the differences in take-off trajectories of France and England. As Alain Peyrefitte ( England as a modern nation "we are already in the modern world -the world of banks, cheques, budgets, the stock-exchange, the periodical press, coffee-houses, clubs (…) It is a world in which government put first the promotion of production, for policy is no longer determined by aristocrats" (Hill, 1961) . Many other reasons may be brought up, such as the diverging influence on economic dynamism of Protestantism and Catholicism, the Peyrefitte core thesis. To catch-up with this lag, a strong State will emerge. Reinert mentions the role of Colbert "as an entrepreneurial input-coordinator for France Inc., in a venture to get into knowledge based activities (…) to deal with "reverse salients" retarding the system and demanding managerial attention". In the French pattern, polity frames economy and science is a common good, in the baconian sense, while in the English pattern, polity and science are to support individual initiative and responsibility. But, as Liliane Hilaire- Perez (2002) demonstrates it, both systems cross fertilized, balancing market incentives and license by the state to support innovators: As a critic of the individualistic bias of the patent system the creation of the Society of Arts in 1753 relies on philanthropic objectives making inventions a common good, while the French scientific academism is challenged by the desires of inventors to access the market through the support of investors.
The French (i.e., the public NIS) worked especially well in the catching up and golden age periods, taking audacious initiatives as the decision by the royal administration to spy, in the 18 th century, on British innovations in the steel industry (Landes, 2000) . By 1900, England began to lose her leadership: her productivity was overshot by that of Germany and France in proportion to the bad social consensus between workers and employers and the weakening interest for innovation (Crouzet 2000, p. 229) . So, the point is not, as it is commonly said, to decide which institutional arrangement is the more competitive. Each system is path dependant and France needed to build performing institutions through the edification of a powerful state: if, at the end of the 19 th century, as Crouzet put it, France was a mighty industrial power, she was not an industrial nation. Her national income relied mainly on agriculture and this situation will need the blooming of the trente glorieuses to be fully offset s. This has consequences on the prevalent culture and on the role of institutions: if France is traditionally a country of innovators, it is by fascination for science in the Baconian sense and not for an industrial purpose. The French bourgeois is a rent-seeker, a rentier, who, as an investor "preferred fixed-interest securities (…) to more speculative industrial shares." (Landes, 2003) . This situation was inherited from the 16 th century when the monarchy, constantly running out of cash, sold offices (an appointment providing a rent for life against an immediate payment) to the bourgeois. Landes tells us that the founder of the Crédit Lyonnais, Jean Germain, declared in 1860 that there were no industrialists in France worthy of support (Landes, 2003) . Whether industry funding relied on homespun capital or not, the rentier was not interested in investment. Consequently, the State had to mitigate this deficiency of the ruling class and become an investor, and, after 1945, a manager, through strong state-owned industrial companies. This has produced a very particular pattern where public institutions are self justified, representing the common good, or in Rousseau political philosophy "la volonté générale." This system worked when ruled by a visionary leader as de Gaulle. But it is clear that since the 1974 turning point, it became less efficient in the blooming of the information technologies potential. (2004) say it bluntly: the French NIS and in particular its educational system (which is presently the second bureaucratic organization in the world -measured in terms of personnel-just behind the Chinese People's Liberation Army) is "catching up minded" and not adequate for forging ahead on the new technological frontier. A temptation would be to recognize, under the "new economy" fashion, the superiority of the market NIS and to adopt new institutional arrangements. This is not relevant according to Amable and Petit who don't find long-term correlation between a particular kind of NIS and global performance. Historical studies lead to the same conclusion, as Landes put it, each industrializing society developed its own combination of elements to fit its traditions, possibilities and circumstances. The French NIS proved its ability to innovate at the institutional level, but its present bureaucracy with decreasing outcomes and increasing costs may constitute a bottleneck. So, our questions become "How can historically self-legitimized public service organizations recognize the new paradigm challenge and change to meet it?" and "will crises be, in this case, of special interest?.
Aghion and Cohen
Managing crisis for change: four case studies I review four episodes, two in the US, two in France. The US case studies are based on existing, secondary sources: [Charlotte City managers published a thorough saga of their ten years journey in managing change since the 1992 crisis. NYPD story benefits from the study by Silverman The common trait found in each of these cases is a paradigm mismatch between the internal equilibrium of the organization and the growing complexity of its environment and mission.
Before the crisis, these institutions had different levels of resilience, depending on their history and their accumulated organizational capabilities that are challenged by a shock, following different scenarios.
-The provoked crisis as a momentum: Revolution in blue at the NYPD New York Police Department (NYPD) was, in 1994, facing a double challenge: reducing crime within the city as promised by the new elected mayor, Rudolf Giuliani, and reforming itself to fight internal corruption. NYPD was at the K phase, over institutionalized, with periodic scandals regarding corruption. As a system, NYPD was homeostatic; all intent of change was neutralized.
According to Silverman (Silverman, 1999) , "NYPD is like an ocean liner-its course is extremely difficult to change. A reluctant crew savors management obstacles, pleased with the inefficiencies of an enormous bureaucracy." Prior to 1994, the former commissioner, Patrick Murphy, who was in charge for eighteen years, made huge efforts to fight corruption and gain good records. Murphy dedicated himself to the management of the NYPD and proved that change deserves constant efforts. But, while he paved the way for the post 1994 transformation, he didn't succeed in completely transforming NYPD organization.
Murphy's managerial approach was classical: he benefited from a strong political support and sympathy among top-level personnel but "the department skillfully engulfed some of Murphy's change without disturbing many existing practices" (Silverman, 1999 ). Murphy's topdown approach did not involve many street-level cops who considered themselves orphans of the organizational process. Murphy relied on a small faction of innovators but had to face other traditionalists; so he never succeeded in sweeping out corruption entirely from the department.
The third reason of Murphy's limited results is due to the ideological context: he subscribed to the prevailing ideas that crime was the product of social and economic factors that outweighed police efforts. So, Murphy focused on the sole problem of internal corruption without mobilizing the department on crime reduction.
Overall, we can say that the amount of disruptive change injected to transform the NYPD was not sufficient. In spite of crises due to corruption scandals (Ω stage), the change process had too weak α and r stages and rebuilt itself at the same level of resilience.
When arriving to charge, some days after Giuliani's election as a mayor, William Bratton implemented a new strategy: First, crime reduction became the main strategic issue and he gave up with the sociological explications of crime so as to build a direct link between NYPD efficiency and crime reduction. Secondly, change was orchestrated through reengineering based on the street-level cop so as to outweigh the resilience of bureaucracy and its numerous hierarchical layers.
To start with this strategy, the momentum was an incident at the Harlem Mosque where Muslim activists were sequestrating two police officers. Years before, a similar incident had resulted with giving up any suits to avoid further incidents with activists. For Bratton, this incident was a gift to broadcast its message "law and order will be enforced." Towards the public, ambitious objectives of crime reduction are announced to dramatically reduce crime, fear and disorder. These objectives can't be reached through the traditional bureaucratic management of NYPD and imply a profound reengineering if its organization. Top management has to present a crime reduction strategy and after one month many of them and about one third of the precinct commanders are removed. The bureaucratic organization of the NYPD is challenged with the empowerment of street-level cops who become the drivers of the new strategy that will be called the "revolution in blue." Every step towards decentralizing initiative must be balanced by centralizing the monitoring: this will be done with the CompStat (Compare Statistics) system which will allow the strategy to be sharpen by an objective measurement system involving each precinct commander in collective problem solving activities, the same system making the NYPD accountable towards the public of its achievements in crime reduction.
The results are widely known: crime rates fell dramatically in New York City; so did corruption within NYPD.
Bratton's strategy may be summed up in putting NYPD in disequilibrium to break its resilience (Ω stage) that had neutralized all the previous reform initiatives and then to rebuild a new system, more complex and focused on crime reduction results. The reengineering process initiated a profound reorganization phase (α) while the implementation of collective problem solving activities through CompStat meetings improved connectedness within NYPD organization, leading to a new state of resilience and equilibrium K.
Key success factors appear to be the sharing of a common vision and will between the newly elected mayor and the new police commissioner on its reducing crime program. A clear understanding of the organizational nature of the NYPD and its reluctance to change allow the creation of the momentum of the crisis and make it the starting point of the reform, giving impetus to a wide learning collective process benefiting from an extended use of information technology.
-
Making an event a momentum: Learning by consensus building at Charlotte
The City of Charlotte (North Carolina, USA) experiment is known for being the first opportunity for professors Norton and Kaplan to apply their balanced scorecard approach to a public service.
The story began in 1992 with a financial crisis that would lead the city to the brink of bankruptcy.
Obeying a NPM approach to such crises would have led to downsizing decisions and personal reductions, followed by reduced performance and declining morale. The Ω to α phase wouldn't produce a reorganization of the system but another, poorer, system. Instead, the city council decided to implement a rightsizing approach (City of Charlotte, 2000) . This decision will turn what would have stayed an episode in the history of an administrative structure in a strategic crisis that will become a momentum for change. What was at stake? Charlotte faced a rapid growth as a city with consecutive growth in its administrative structure and expenses were growing faster than revenues. Charlotte's growth relied on corporations and was known as a "corporate town." The City didn't want to lose its AAA credit rating and wanted to save its reputation towards the corporate community by not raising property taxes as the sole solution to overcome the crisis.
While freezing expenses creates the momentum for change, rightsizing indicates the path. The "Blueprint for Rightsizing" was presented to the City Council in March 1992 as the administration's assessment of the changing environment in which the City government was operating, and its outlook on the future. "The current hierarchal structure," according to the report, was "characterized by layers of supervisors, centralized controls, and policies that supposedly covered all situations and were developed over time in response to legitimate needs and circumstances. But those circumstances have changed significantly."
While short-term deficit were addressed through incentives to voluntary retirement and a freeze on hiring, long-term costs were identified as being those of a bureaucratic structure with many supervisory layers. The blueprint brought about a setback of one year for the city organization to strive to become a customer focused organization with a decentralized management, an agile, results oriented structure and putting emphasis on leadership as opposed to supervision and control: Rightsizing was defined « about reallocating resources and is based on transferring positions and resources from lower priority to higher priority areas. » (City of Charlotte, 2000, p.
17)
Debating within focus groups helped define a new vision and strategic priorities allowing tough decisions to be made such as restructuring the organization top to bottom, or shifting people and resources where they were most needed. The results of rightsizing were significant This approach helped create connectedness within employees and saved capital and potential for the building of a new organization. The no-lay-off policy was the price to pay to foster an Ω to α phase that would bring the system to a new stage of equilibrium with new management principles. Downsizing with "across the board" lay-offs would have killed the internal systemic dynamic to give rise to new organizational patterns.
To build a resilient system -the r to K phase -the City decided in 1994 to implement the balanced scorecard as a measurement system and steering tool to monitor the new result oriented organization. The BSC implementation supported a tough process of organizational transformation based on citizen orientedness to define the main strategic benefits, strategic alignment as a principle of process reengineering, "keep or privatize" to assess the costs against the market, and the integration of the performances of the organization as a means to define wages and incentives. This is a long process: for the first time in 2000 the city budget has been voted in relation to the priorities of the main strategic issues.
Presenting these results, the city manager writes (City of Charlotte, 2000) "many of these developments might seem like they were part of a systematic strategy. But when I embarked on this course a decade ago, it was by no means fully charted. The strategy evolved, guided by core principles. ». The key success factor was not, by comparison with the Bratton approach in NYPD, a clear vision of what has to be done, but the consensus building that started with the double decision of making the budgetary crisis the momentum for change and the no lay-off policy. This allowed monitoring an organizational learning process. BSC method came later, as a tool to build a resilient organization being able to reengineer itself permanently.
-Profiting by an unforeseeable crisis: the 1999 tempest and the ONF
The Office National des Forêts (ONF) is the French governmental agency in charge of the management of the public forests. For a long time, its business model is unbalanced: State forest -which exploitation is a ONF monopole -represents 40% of its business portfolio towards 35% for those of local communities, a semi monopolistic activity, since communities may deal with another provider. Other activities are purely commercial (15%) or purely public interest missions (10%) The first produces a surplus, which finances the deficit of the latter. Such a situation is abnormal, for it is not the ONF mission to subsidize local communities forest management. These losses are caused by too many local branches and the absence of commercial discussion with those communities, which lobby at the political level for the situation remaining unchanged.
In 1998, ONF must face a new dual strategy: on the one hand, complying with Helsinki sustainable forest's management objectives, that is, improving Europe's sustainable forest management as ecosystems, and on the other hand, gaining productivity as a consequence of the market opening to competition. This implies developing a commercial culture among employees.
Since 1998, it has been decided to gain productivity in this local communities sector to rebalance the business model. The targeted business model is fourfold: gaining productivity in the state forest sector as a consequence of the opening of markets; gaining productivity in the local public communities sector to avoid the subsidizing perverse effect from the former to the latter; developing purely commercial offerings at competitive prices and providing general interest missions at their real cost through commercially equilibrated contracts with the state. This implies developing a commercial culture among employees. In 1998, a strategic plan was adopted: becoming a major player in the environmental fields, meaning enhancing a commercial culture to the service of sustainable forest management objectives.
The parent body office has traditionally a poor ability to proceed in such reengineering in a highly unionized environment.
At the end of December 1999, two storms destroyed large parts of the French forests in what has become a national catastrophe: 45 millions tons of wood were destroyed and 130 000 hectares are to be reconstructed, that represent 3 years of the medium annual yield, 10 in the eastern part of France. Immediately, in January 2001, negotiations began with buyers but with a threat of a price crash due to the disequilibrium between supply and demand. No sales will occur until March. The governmental intervention will allow the market to be regulated and, in the end, wood will be sold at a higher price than forecasted, but losses are important regarding with budget forecasts.
But the trauma has been consequential: it provokes an intense mobilization among the Office employees. Hard working rhythms during 2000 led to a greater awareness of the situation.
While the office earned a new legitimacy among its partners -especially local communities which were reluctant towards the reengineering of the business model -that meant paying for ONF services at their real cost because the implicit subsidy to local communities was the real source of ONF's deficit. The Office management will make the beginning of the reengineering process an opportunity to foster what Midler calls "emphasizing objectives and tangible elements to overcome actor's subjectivity" (Midler, 1995) . This will be a vote in favor of the plan since 70% of employees will apply in spite of the unions' opposition.
The conjugation of the crisis management and the reengineering of the business model had allowed a negotiation with the local communities and to understand what the ONF business model has to be, based on the synergy between activities, managed as a portfolio: Public forests management are monopolistic or semi monopolistic activities that must support competition in terms of costs and deal with public sustainable development issues, while other activities are fully competitive. Costs and tariffs logics are different according to each activity, but the key points is knowing costs, that is emphatically coined as "moving toward a commercial culture".
On such a clarified basis, negotiations with local communities and other partners have been completed on a mutual benefit basis for each part.
Important investments in the information system allow to see the real costs and to link performance evaluation to operational results.
The key success factor is in this case the previous clear vision within the management of what has to be the new business model, which is classically an r to K phase job. But without managing the crisis as a momentum for change, it wouldn't have benefited from an Ω to α phase which created the condition of a new vision of the agency role and tangible elements it was based on.
-Strike as a welcome momentum: putting the French National Library back on track
The project of a new Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF), dedicated to replace the old one built by Richelieu, was one of the several prestige projects launched by president Mitterrand to commemorate his reign and to bequeath his mark to posterity. The project was costly: 7,2 billion FF ($1,5 billion US) to allow the construction of what would be the most prestigious building. It was driven by what its first CEO has defined as "technical arrogance" that was the direct consequence of its political arrogance (Stasse, 2002) .
The consequence will result in a design of the working place that won't integrate the precise contingencies of librarians' business. Designers will dedicate all their efforts to what was visible to the public, not on the employees' working conditions. Moreover, they won't comprehend the change that will result in the working process by moving from a 1200 employee library in a 17 th century building and working on a craftsman basis to a fully computerized 2800 employee building.
Especially, the information system will be the benchmark of this technical arrogance: computer scientists conceived the system without any discussion with librarians. In fact the information system was conceived as a war machine against the employees who looked archaic to the engineers. The system was over sophisticated and, as engineers said, was ready to work at 98% but with the 2°% missing it was not possible to make this arrogant project work.
In 1998, sometime after the grand opening, employees went on a general strike for several months, asking for better working conditions. They gained support from the readers and, in fact, from the management who was conscious that the project didn't work.
The management decision has taken advantage of this strike to put the project back on track through the elaboration of a strategic plan. Focus groups gathered in every department, including readers and representatives of the librarian's profession. This participative process will help to break the arrogant image of the BNF while issuing proposals that will help pointing out key strategic objectives. Five key focus areas are released linked to results and management indicators. As I have shown (Rochet, 2003) ,this approach meets the requirement of the balanced scorecard in spite of the fact managers had never heard about this methodology. Emphasis is put on customers' satisfaction whether physically or through the website (http://www.bnf.fr), associated with process improvement regarding collections and their availability to the public, the implementation of accrual accounting to allow the linking between strategic needs and resources allocations decisions, and with better working conditions. As a result, the board, which was a battlefield between employees, readers and managers moved to a strategic monitoring function that is negotiating a contract with the State parent body that is today a benchmark within the field of agency's management.
The crisis originated in classical technical project mismanagement due to the prevalence of political and technical arrogance. It could have resulted in a complete failure or new investments to reengineer the project. In fact, this project had no resilience at all since it never worked. The strike was motivated by the desire of the librarians not to do their noble job is such hellish conditions. It is the shared decision of making the strike a momentum for change that gave the project its present today resilience through the strategic process that creates mobilization of the agency's potential and connectedness among the employees and management. As a result, the Library is alive, but practically the business model has been reconceived bottom-up, starting from readers needs and appropriate working functions for librarians. It is very unlike to the initial politically arrogant project.
Findings and conclusions
So far, three statements may be drawn:
1. Crises must be managed and what is important in the cases presented is the decision to make the crisis a momentum for change. In the case of NYPD, it was proved that successive corruption crises were unable to provoke a reengineering of the system due to its high level of resilience, while in a system with no resilience, as BNF, the crisis would have lead to the bankruptcy of the project or to unhealthy compromised decisions. In these processes, it is the leadership of managers who understood what was at stake and what had to change that allow the crisis to be endogenized and to tackle the organizational innovation process.
2. In all case studies one successful key factor is the existence of a previous strategic framework among managers. Bratton and Giuliani had a clear view of what performance had to be for the NYPD. Charlotte city council had a vision of the future of the city and the role of its administration. At ONF, the new business model was in the managers' minds, and instead of their new and mismanaged equipment, the BNF librarians knew their job and what service quality to customer had to be and how new technology would improve it. Leadership does not suffice: managers must have their mental map updated or be able to update it, along the evolutionary process.
3. While the "what" question is essential, the question "how" is not: NYPD is the only case where the manager was ready to use methodology as a fan for the reengineering fashion of the beginning of the nineties. In Charlotte managers found their methodology through learning by doing and adapting off-the-shelf methodology such as balanced scorecard. In BNF, the process was purely inductive. This is consistent with the evolutionary nature of organizations as living systems: the process is not deterministic and once they have a stable goal, it finds, thanks to the managers initiatives, its own path to reach an equilibrium state through a trial and error process.
These points may be common to all organizations, and it may be reassuring that public organizations and not "Genetically Modified Organizations" that would not obey the principle of organization dynamics. In none of the cases was it needed to resort to privatization or other neoclassical coined solutions: killing the patient didn't appeared to be the unique solution to cure the disease.
So, what would be specific to public organizations? Recall the discussion in section 1 on the reason why crisis is part if the picture in the public sector: they are behind in updating their cultural framework -North would speak of "informal constraints" -to the new opportunities of the raising paradigm. Concluding that public organizations are able to update mental maps is important, since they are the underlying learning processes of institutional evolution. They are the players while institutions are the rule makers. Actors' cultural evolution creates informal constraints, while institutions create formal constraints. North emphasizes on the consequences of a mismatch between informal and formal constraints "When there is a radical change in the formal rules that makes them inconsistent with the existing informal constraints, there is an unresolved tension between them that will lead to long-run political instability" (North, 119, p. 140 ). It would not suffice to create appropriate formal rules if informal rules don't evolve.
Analyzing the origins of English success in the first industrial revolution, North insists on the role of such informal constraints that were hospitable to change in formal rules. In the present technological revolution, decision of implementing IT in public organizations would limit in putting "lipstick on a bull dog" if informal constraints and culture didn't evolve to allow business model to transform. In other words, crisis, if properly managed as a learning organizational process is an opportunity to enhance organizational paradigms, At this point, I can draw two conclusions for public management. (1) The first is optimistic: public organizations are able to change and crisis is an opportunity if endogenized by managers.
If a public policy maker wants to build top-down new formal rules that mismatch with informal rules, properly managed crises may offer an opportunity to build bottom-up new informal rules and to enhance the fitness of the global institutional arrangement.
(2) The second is pessimistic: What happens if managers, through managing change in public organizations, create performing informal rules but with a poor feed-back on politicians' culture?
I can't reach, at this point, conclusions about how successful crisis management at the organizational level may help to trigger innovation at the institutional level.
(1) When endogenized, crises may lead organizational learning: The concept of resilience is relevant to understand, within the pattern of system dynamics, why an organization can come into crisis and how crises may be overcome through a learning process that leads the system to a superior state of equilibrium. Sustainable organizations are those that are able to achieve such four phase cycles. However, system dynamics is driven by non-linearity and unpredictability, so crises, while they offer opportunities to reach a new stable state through the weakening of the resilience of the former, are of poor use per se: Management theory often misused the chaos theory, leading to the false assumption that putting a system in disequilibrium suffices to allow it to find its new equilibrium. Chaos theory is a deterministic process that supposes stable initial conditions, and if it may apply within a stable structure (for instance to steer an internal innovation process), such conditions do not exist in an open world where each sub-system is semi-autonomous and co-evolves with others. Thenceforth, not all cycles are the same, some are maladaptive, there are several possible future equilibrium states and the costs of sliding into an undesirable state are severe (Holling CS, Gunderson L. and alii, 2000) .
The quest for global fitness requires the modeling of the subsystem environment: a disruption in the technological sub-system needs to model a new pattern of the economic one and the research of a new institutional pattern to reach its full deployment. NYPD "revolution in blue" was successful thanks to the co evolution of ideas and politics that produced increasing returns.
Crisis is helpful to impel such an organizational innovation process. Crisis is an exogenous event, regardless of its cause, but innovation is endogenous through a disruption within the system. My case studies are consistent with the Schumpeterian role of the entrepreneur in innovation, as Freeman and Louça summarize it "innovation is endogenous to the system, but it is finally determined by the entrepreneurial function, that unique capacity to make new combinations, which is clearly outside the domain of the model" (Freeman, 2000: p. 59 ). Clearly, change happens when the entrepreneur endogenizes the crisis.. This entrepreneur may be a charismatic leader such as Bratton in the NYPD case. In the other cases, the management teams assumed entrepreneurship. This entrepreneurship consisted in making the organizational system think about its role, how it creates value for the common good and in building new consensus on values and new management techniques. The entrepreneurship is supported by a low turnover, both amid politicians and managers. In Charlotte, the average mandate for elected people was over 7 years. Bratton and Giuliani formed a united couple before the Giuliani election and during its period as a Mayor. We can find such examples in the French administration where the average period in charge for a high civil servant is about 3 years. The reformer of the Ministry of transportation stayed 7.5 years in charge (1981 -1988) , and the builder of sanitary agencies network 11.5 years (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) .
The key success factor for change from one state of resilience to another is learning. Not only double-loop learning that questions the underlying model (Argyris and Schon, 1978) In all the cases, the introduction of information technologies was a key to foster such a process.
In NYPD, CompStat became a tool to build collective knowledge and to empower the street level cop. In Charlotte, IT leveraged the development of new skills. In ONF, IT, through the knowing of costs, allowed to integrate a commercial culture leading to new business frameworks and new productivity benchmarks. At BNF, librarians appropriate IT, initially conceived to declare a new war between ancients and moderns. Doing so, the external technological paradigm shift is endogenized to become a socio-organizational paradigm shift.
When endogenizing the crisis, the entrepreneur makes the system evolve through the enrichment of its knowledge base. This is consistent with Joël Mokyr's approach on useful knowledge.
Mokyr defines useful knowledge as the underlying structure of an evolutionary model that he calls the "propositional" knowledge (or knowledge "what") containing but not confined to scientific consensus knowledge but also a set of beliefs, traditions, superstitions and other knowledge systems that would explain why something works. This knowledge maps onto artifacts, or techniques (managerial recipes are such techniques), that Mokyr names "prescriptive" knowledge (or knowledge "how"). The building of artifacts feeds back on propositional knowledge, while techniques reproduce themselves through learning by doing, as shown in figure 4 (Mokyr, 1998) . The weakness of NPM is that it deals only with recipes -or knowledge "how" -and is not preoccupied in triggering this adaptive work that will give feedback on the propositional knowledge -or knowledge "what" -that contains the real informal rules that will foster or impeach change. Since 1800, says Mokyr, prescriptive knowledge hasn't survived without a propositional knowledge base (Mokyr, 2003) . That is what happens with NPM. Giuliani, who was amongst the most radical NPM mayors, was the one who less applied its principles and gained the best results. He chose from the NPM agenda "to conform to his own political agenda and in response to the political environment in New-York City" (Weikart, 2001) . Practically, NPM practitioners had to give up with its prescriptions to find serendipitously more convenient solutions that would enhance the content of their prescriptive knowledge. In the competitive sector, organizations no longer think about their strategy solely in terms of structure or managerial recipes, but in terms of organizational capabilities as well. By capabilities I mean core competencies that are the result of the accumulated propositional knowledge by learning-bydoing. Ongoing research by Roger Miller shows that competencies tend to cluster in "strategic games of innovation" and that the art of management in the new paradigm is to understand the game one is playing and the competencies required to succeed at the game (Miller &Floricel, 2003) . This focus on playing with competencies makes change a continuous process avoiding hard adjustment crises and could become a major preoccupation for public managers. As a consequence, the training and selection of managers is critical: leadership relying on an intuitive comprehension of system dynamics and of the path of transition toward a more complex but stable architecture is essential. Such qualities are not widespread among managers in the public sector while organizational transformation and radical change has become familiar to those in the competitive sector. The prevalent public sector framework is that a system may not be changed without a change in the legal framework or without a rise or a decrease in resources allocation.
Politicians fear crisis. They, therefore, seldom provide the necessary leadership to manage it as a momentum for change. My survey shows that there are not any cultural or institutional inabilities for managers to integrate, by learning by doing, the rules of the game of the new paradigm and to play with it. But, reversing the actual path dependency does not only require learning by doing but also learning-before-doing to introduce new patterns in the manager's mental maps (Pisano, 2000) , say new propositional knowledge. As Mokyr put it, "When an existing technique needs to be extended or adapted to different circumstances, the content and extent of the epistemic base become important (…) trial and error might work, of course, but it is more uncertain, slower and more expensive" (Mokyr, 2003, p. 14) A theoretical approach is necessary, leading to the creation of new managerial knowledge that would be implemented though the initial and continuous training of public managers so as to give up the prevalent technocratic culture.
How crises at the organizational level may help institutional innovation?:
History is not made of institutional crises but of continuous incremental adjustments. North emphasizes on this point "It is the dominant way by which societies and economies have evolved" (North, 1990, p. 101) . Institutions are able to learn and obey the principle of increasing returns that define their path dependency. Crises happen when the macro-level incentives provided by the institutional framework diverge from the micro level techno-economic activity.
Crises take place at the climax of the mismatch between the new and the old institutional paradigm. The stronger the mismatch, the stronger the crisis. Crisis management is then required to reverse the path dependency through changes in polity.
It could be hypothesized that fostering the organizational learning process within public sector would help to shorten discontinuities with economic, social and political institutions and to update decision makers' mental maps to design such policies. That would assume that the knowledge created in organizations would give feedback on institution's cultural framework as a rule maker, as shown in figure 4 , leading to the building of new rules with a better ability to support entrepreneurship at the organizational level. But institutional innovation is more than the sum of innovative organizational breakthroughs. It has to be a learning process in itself that could explain why these successes could lead to new rules.
In my survey of public agencies in France (Rochet, 2002) , benchmarked against other OECD countries, I clearly made obvious that agency, as an organizational solution, may conciliate the sense of public service and entrepreneurship, and improve managerial capabilities.
Agencies would play the role of a nursery of new managerial knowledge and new public managers able to build the new paradigm formal and informal constraints. This is not the case. Two reasons may be invoked. First, designing a new institutional framework needs more than the sole feedbacks from organizational innovations. These feedbacks signpost elements of a new trend in public management that would require special attention from politicians. But the knowledge "what" built in organizations for the rule players is no more than knowledge "how" for public institutions as rule makers. Creating new institutional knowledge in policymaking would be complemented by foresight, scenario planning and long term policy planning. The momentum for change, in institutions, is before the crisis. Change requires ordering leaders' perceptions about alternative future environments in which today's decisions might be played out. Scenario planning has to embrace qualitative perspectives and the potential for sharp discontinuities that incumbent econometric models exclude. Creating scenarios requires decision-makers to question their broadest assumptions -i.e. to question their knowledge "what"-about the way the world works so they can foresee decisions that might be missed or denied. On the contrary, present policy making mainly relies on reacting to crises, and doing so, reinforces the policies' sectorial character and prevent it to comprehend complex issues. For instance, rethinking social security issues (about 24% of French GDP) requires embracing demographics, ageing, new diseases impacts, the future of economics, weighing risks and not only the reengineering of social securities organizations.
Second, as a consequence, the cultural trend might favor such a process. Although each great French town's newly elected mayor has to embark on a compulsory trip to NYPD to learn about CompStat and to give up the prevalent candid attitude toward crime, the present trend is unlikely to create new knowledge in policy making. The 1990s fashions of "the end of history" or "new economy" played down the role of policy making, inducing policy makers to rely either on the believing in "progress" and others "singing tomorrows" as a sustainable trend toward a better life denounced by Pierre-André Taguieff or on the cult of the market, coined by Stiglitz as "market bolshevism". According to Taguieff (2000) , such beliefs lead to the "erasing of the future" and the abandoning of policy making. The classical "governing is foreseeing" is coming into "governing is following" ideological fashions.
Ii is possible that this trend is likely to reverse. The rapidly growing literature of the new institutional Economics (NIE) revives the old school that draws on economic history, political science, sociology and psychological economics. Through a thorough review of this literature, a recent OECD study concludes that there is a correlation between a strong State and institutional quality (OECD, 2004) . I demonstrated that a "strong state" doesn't imply a strong and resilient bureaucracy that would cancel, by its decreasing returns, the benefit of institutions on the wide range of transaction costs. On the contrary, ability to monitor change and to manage crises at the organizational level exists and may not be given as a pretext to political passivity in managing the adjustment process. This very adjustment process' Achille's heel relies on the cultural framework of policy making. But, we leave here the domain of public management to enter into the very source of "the crisis of our times" stemming, as Leo Strauss put it, from the abandoning of political philosophy, that is Aristotle's interrogation on what is a good society. The coming back focus on the role of the state advocated by NIE would offer an opportunity to reverse the trend. On this figure we couple North's distinction between institutions as rule makers and organizations as rule players and Mokyr's knowledge creation process in organizations. The managerial knowledge base maps onto organizational patterns that evolve through learning by doing. New patterns emerge end give feed back to the knowledge base, helping create new knowledge. This knew knowledge gives poor feed-back toward public institutions.
